



## TUI Airline Ground Operations Information Notice

<b>Title:</b>	<b>TAGO RASLITE November 2025</b>	<b>Reference:</b> <b>GOIN25-068</b>
<b>Validity date:</b>	01 DEC 2025 – 31 DEC 2025	
<b>To:</b>	All Stations	
<b>From:</b>	Michael George, Regulations and Standards Specialist	
<b>Applicability:</b>	TOM-BY / BLX-6B / JAF-TB / TFL-OR / TUI-X3	
<b>References:</b>	N/A	

Dear partner,

Attached to this Information Notice, you can find a copy of November's RASLITE (Regulations And Standards – Learnings – Information – Trending – Education).

Feel free to pass this on to all relevant staff.

Kind regards.  
TUI Airline Ground Operations



# RASLITE – November 25 Edition

Regulations And Standards – Learnings – Information – Trending - Education

# What is RASLITE

- ❑ RASLITE is a monthly presentation compiled by the Regulations and Standards Team to pass on learnings, and information that are trending and to educate our people about incidents that have occurred across all AOCs
- ❑ Events happen on different AOCs but learnings are not consistently shared between our people so that we can take actions to try and prevent a repeat event at different airports. Safety should always come first and learnings should be shared amongst all of our teams so they can take these away to their airports
- ❑ Our AOC GOSAG and TAGO SAG meetings have different audiences but never before has there been a standardized way of sharing our learnings with the Airport Teams
- ❑ RASLITE will be made available for each of the 5 AOC SAGs to be presented by the Regulations and Standards Team during the meeting. It will also be presented at the TAGO SAG. It is designed to be short, snappy and informative and offer the opportunity for safety discussions and exchanging of ideas

Regulations And Standards – Learnings – Information – Trending - Education

# Good Reporting

## EMA form not completed

- 👉 On today's arrival flight, it was observed that the EMA tag form was not correctly completed. The form was missing the loading supervisor's signature, the hold position was not indicated, and the name of the person responsible for securing the EMA was not provided.

**ELECTRIC MOBILITY AID TAG**  
TUI

Make/Model: 211 Flight Number: 101001  
Weight: 211 Date: 1 Feb  
Customer Name: W. Schenck Destination: 1 Feb

Battery Type: WCLB Watt Hour Rating: 1000 WOOD: ☐ SPARE/ADDITIONAL: ☐

Which one method has been used to inhibit the electrical circuits of the vehicle?  
(Obtain information from EMITA tag or manufacturer's written instructions)  
☐ Power switched off with key removed and given to customer  
☐ Detach cable from battery/controller/wireless and protect against short circuit  
☐ Inserted inhibiting plug (e.g. "airsoft" plug)  
☒ Lithium battery removed, taken in to cabin and protect against short circuit  
☐ Other (please state in the box below):

Special Loading Instructions: (e.g. Do not collapse)

Person responsible for making the Electric Mobility Aid safe for carriage  
I confirm that I have protected the device from short circuits and have inhibited the electrical circuits as indicated above.  
Name:  Signature:

Confirm that the following loading instructions have been completed:  
Electric mobility aid is loaded upright/collapsed into a separate netted compartment or ULD, segregated from any other loose baggage items and correctly secured using appropriate restraints. (Shocking rings are NOT to be used).  
Electric Mobility Aid loaded in hold ☐ Battery in hold ☐ Battery in cabin ☒  
and/or ULD position:  If battery in cabin: \*Seat number: 10C

Loading Supervisor / Team leader / Head loader  
I confirm that the Electric Mobility Aid is loaded and secured in accordance with current TUI instructions and have checked the Electric Mobility Aid does not operate.  
Name:  Signature:

DO NOT DISMANTLE EMA WITHOUT PASSENGER AUTHORISATION

# Good Reporting


## GPU panel open.

☺ The aircraft arrived at the stand, and it was noticed that the GPU flap was open



## Hold handle not stowed.

☺ Upon the flight's arrival, we noticed an issue with the forward hold door. The handle was not in its proper position.





# Safety Events

## Anti collision light ignored during engine test run.

- During an engine test run a staff member from our handling partner drove in front of running engine with 3 dollies of luggage and continued ignoring the anti-col beacon while continuing to drive behind the running engine. Staff member was approached by airside patrol.

Follow up. The operator involved in the incident is assigned to the baggage hall and, as such, is required to undergo additional practical training for airside driving.

## Cones missing.


- Missing cones on the left wingtip and engine



# Safety Events

## Insecure EMA in ULD

- ☹ EMA was not secured in the arrival ULD. The rope had no tension with incorrect anchor points being used, which could have resulted in damage to the EMA and ULD.



# Safety Events

## Pushback SOP not followed

- ☺ Following pushback and tug disconnect, ground crew departed A/C and then failed to display bypass pin (not seen on person). ATC contacted who deployed an ops vehicle to confirm bypass pin removed. At start of taxi, nose wheel controls verified prior to further taxi as added measure.

## PAX disembarking - Ramp

- ☺ On disembarkation, PAX were walking under the wing and not around the cones. There was agent and driver stood on the apron. The crew couldn't get the agents attention as his back was turned.  
Ground staff weren't watching passengers, as several at this point had walked underneath the wing to the bus from the rear of aircraft. The crew highlighted this to the agent. He did apologise and said it had been a very busy day in the airport.



# Higher Risk Safety Events

## **Incorrect loading**

- ☺ LIR stated nil fit in H1, 35BAGS + 103kg WCBD H2, 15 bags H4 and the remainder in H3. The aircraft was loaded with the 103kg WCBD in H1 and 35 bags in H2. The misload was noted after the aircraft departed and the loadsheets / LIR was not cross checked by the TCO and loading supervisor.

## **Open GPU panel.**

- ☺ Following the pushback manoeuvre, and once the aircraft commenced taxiing under its own power, personnel observed that the Ground Power Unit (GPU) panel remained open. The control tower was promptly notified and instructed to halt the aircraft. Subsequently, the dispatcher proceeded to the aircraft's location accompanied by a marshaller and ensured the panel was properly secured.

## **EMA form completed incorrectly.**

- ☺ Lithium battery left on EMA that was about to be loaded in the hold. EMA form signed by the PRM service provider to say that battery had been removed and was safe for travel. It wasn't picked up or checked by ground crew until the customer told the crew that it was still attached to the EMA.

# Higher Risk Safety Events

## Incorrect acceptance of EMA battery ex UK to destination

- Passenger boarded with a lithium battery. Crew paperwork said it was 280wh. On checking the battery, it was found to be 360wh.



Please refer to GOSA25-007 - TUI Airline - EMA acceptance at Check-in & EMA form completion, 13th November

